Whether justice can be denied to litigant if his action is due to wrong legal advice of Advocate?

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In Mahamaya Banerjee AIR 1989 Cal 106,  Supreme Court division bench of Justice M.K. Mukherjee and Sudhanshu Shekhar Ganguly observed that having considered the nature and contents of the various applications filed by the petitioner through her learned Advocate Sri Sachin Mukherjee, we have no hesitation in concluding that the petitioner was wrongly advised by him, particularly in filing the application for drawing up of another preliminary decree by setting aside the ex parte decree earlier passed and in not prosecuting the application earlier filed under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. It is elementary knowledge that so long as a decree, either preliminary or final, legally subsists, it can not be replaced or substituted by another decree. It necessarily follows that if and when the ex parte preliminary decree in the instant suit was set aside by allowing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code then only another preliminary decree could have been passed. Therefore, filing of the application by the petitioner expressing her intention not to proceed with Misc. Case No. 15 of 1979, as she had filed an application for substitution of the preliminary decree, was wholly misconceived and must be attributed to wrong advice of her learned Advocate. In making this observation we have drawn inspiration from the sworn testimony of the learned Advocate himself who admitted that the steps taken by him were not proper and that the applications were filed out of his own bona fide mistake. On facts therefore we are fully satisfied that the petitioner has been badly let down by the wrong advice given to her by her former Advocate and placed in an unenviable position.

From the impugned order we find that the learned Judge appreciated the predicament of the petitioner, but rejected the application solely on the ground that the phrase "sufficient reason" in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code did not include misconception o:

fact and/or law of the Advocate and inherent power could not be used to correct the erroneous view of the learned Advocate. We are, however, unable to agree with the learned Judge.

As has been already noticed, the principal ground which was canvassed for setting aside the above orders was that whatever steps she had taken earlier in connection with the suit was under wrong advice of her Advocate; and as we have already noticed, the testimony of the learned Advocate also supports that view. By filing the application, therefore, the petitioner prayed for justice which was denied to her owing to patently wrong steps taken by her under legal advice. In such a situation the Court would be failing in its duty if it does not invoke its inherent powers to come to her rescue. Every Court functions for the purpose of doing justice according to law and therefore shall be deemed to possess, as a necessary corollary thereto, all such powers as may be necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of its such functioning.